

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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P 271645Z SEP 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2309

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0074

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1974

(SALT TWO -445)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY  
MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF SEPTEMBER  
27, 1974.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 27, 1974

THE IMPORTANCE THE AUTHORITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION  
ATTACH TO SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS  
WAS ONCE AGAIN EMPHASIZED BY USSR MINISTER OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS A.A. GROMYKO IN HIS SPEECH AT THE 29TH SESSION OF  
THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1974. IN THIS  
SPEECH IT IS STATED, IN PARTICULAR, THAT IN THE VIEW OF  
THE SOVIET UNION ONE OF THE FOREMOST AND MOST PRESSING TASKS,  
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ON WHICH EFFORTS MUST BE FOCUSED TODAY, CONSISTS OF ACHIEVING

CONCRETE UNDERSTANDING AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. "THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA, WHERE NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE QUESTIONS RESUMED A FEW DAYS AGO," SAID A.A. GROMYKO, "HAS THE FIRM DIRECTIVE TO SEEK THEIR RESOLUTION. THE SUPREME INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF NOT ONLY THE USSR AND THE U.S., BUT INDEED OF THE WHOLE WORLD, DEMAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, WHO POSSESS THE COLOSSAL POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO FIND APPROPRIATE UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS, AND WE NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT THIS THOUGHT WAS EXPRESSED IN CLEAR FORM BY U.S. PRESIDENT FORD FROM THE PODIUM OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY."

IN THE INTERESTS OF SUCCESSFUL AND TIMELY ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE ASSIGNED TASK OF WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, IT APPEARS ADVISABLE TO PROCEED FROM A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THIS AGREEMENT, ITS POSSIBLE SCOPE AND STRUCTURE. WITH THIS IN MIND, TODAY WE WILL CONTINUE SETTING FORTH OUR APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE TO THE QUESTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

PREPARATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, WITH ALL ITS COMPLEXITY, IS FACILITATED BY THE FACT THAT DURING THE YEARS, 1972-1974 A NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE, FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL, WERE ADOPTED BY THE USSR AND THE U.S. IN THIS CONNECTION WE HAVE IN MIND ABOVE ALL THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS FACING THE DELEGATIONS IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, I WOULD ESPECIALLY LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED TO BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES RECORDED IN THAT DOCUMENT, SPECIFICALLY TO THE EFFECT THAT EFFORTS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER SIDE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF PREVENTING WAR AND EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AND ALSO TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PREREQUISITES FOR STRENGTHENING OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ARE THE RECOGNITION OF THE SECURITY

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INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY, AND THE RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE.

IN LIGHT OF THESE PRINCIPLES THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF APPEALS TO BUILD UP MILITARY MIGHT AND ENSURE A "POSITION OF STRENGTH" IS QUITE EVIDENT. SUCH A POLICY, CONSISTING OF A RELAPSE INTO THE PAST, WHEN THEORIES OF "MILITARY SUPERIORITY" HAD WIDE CURRENCY, IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE SPIRIT

OF THE TIMES AND THE POLICY OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS,  
PROCLAIMED BY BOTH POWERS.

OF COURSE, WHEN WE SPEAK OF RECOGNIZING THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SIDES BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF IMPLEMENTING THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, WE ARE NOT SPEAKING OF PRO FORMA RECOGNITION OF THIS TENET, BUT OF FINDING SOLUTIONS MEETING THIS REQUIREMENT IN SUBSTANCE. IT IS NECESSARY THAT THIS PRINCIPLE BE CONSISTENTLY EMBODIED IN THE CONTENT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, WHICH MUST IN PRACTICE BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. IN SO DOING, THE DURATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES, MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT IT MUST DEAL WITH BOTH THE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IN QUESTIONS OF ENSURING THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES ONE CANNOT, OF COURSE, BUT PROCEED FROM THE EXISTING STRATEGIC SITUATION WITH AN ACCOUNT FOR ITS FUTURE EVOLUTION. THEREFORE, RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS PRESUMES ABOVE ALL CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF AND AN ACCOUNT OF ALL THE FACTORS ACTUALLY INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AS IT APPLIES TO THE SUBJECT AND TASKS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

IT CANNOT BE ASSERTED, WHILE STILL REMAINING OBJECTIVE, THAT EQUALITY OF THE SIDES IN QUESTIONS OF SECURITY WOULD BE ENSURED IF VERY SUBSTANTIAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION OF ONE OF THE SIDES WERE IGNORED.

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FOR, AFTER ALL, IN THAT CASE RECOGNITION OF EQUALITY WOULD BE FORMALISTIC, WHILE IN ACTUALITY THE OTHER SIDE WOULD RECEIVE A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. RECOGNIZED AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM.

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P 271645Z SEP 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2310

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0074

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT PASS DOD

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS/ PARM

SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF SEPT 27, 1974

PROCEEDING FROM THE ABOVE, IN WORKING OUT AN AGREE-  
MENT ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE  
ARMS CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE  
OTHER SIDE.

WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO ENSURE A PROPER ACCOUNT FOR  
THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SIDES IF IN WORKING OUT  
THE NEW AGREEMENT CONSIDERATION DID NOT INCLUDE SUCH STRA-  
TEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AS, FOR EXAMPLE, STRATEGIC BOMBERS?  
FOR AFTER ALL, IN THAT CASE A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF  
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS WOULD REMAIN DISREGARDED, THE  
PICTURE OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WE ARE CONSIDERING WOULD  
BE IMPOMLETE, AND IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE  
DIFFICULT TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT  
THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SIDES EQUALLY.

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THIS IS ALSO TURE WITH RESPECT TO THOSE STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF  
ONE SIDE, WHILE THE OTHER SIDE HAS NO SUCH SYSTEMS. LET

US TAKE, FOR EXAMPLE, FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. IT IS WIDELY KNOWN THAT ONE OF THE SIDES HAS, LOCATED AT BASES ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES, HUNDREDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF DELIVERING TO TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHOSE TOTAL YIELD, CERTAIN CALCULATIONS PUBLISHED IN THE U.S. INDICATE IS TEN OR EVEN HUNDREDS OF TIMES THE TOTAL YIELD OF ALL EXPLOSIVES USED DURING WORLD WAR II.

IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS CANNOT BUT SUBSTANTIALLY INFLUENCE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION OF THE SIDE WHOSE TERRITORY IS UNDER THE THREAT OF POTENTIAL USE OF SUCH SYSTEMS. ANY STATE WOULD CONSIDER IT INCONSISTENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF ITS SECURITY TO EXCLUDE FROM CONSIDERATION SUCH A SUBSTANTIAL NUCLEAR POTENTIAL WHICH, UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, COULD BE USED TO STRIKE A NUCLEAR BLOW ON ITS TERRITORY. THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH SYSTEMS IS A FACT WHICH THE SIDES MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

AS YOU KNOW, IN WORKING OUT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, THE SIDES AGREED TO FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS ON MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF ONLY SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THE PREPARATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, IN WORKING OUT ITS PROVISIONS WE FACE A BROADER TASK, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH IT IS NECESSARY THAT LIMITATIONS BE CONSIDERED FOR ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, INCLUDING FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE.

FURTHERMORE, ONE CANNOT BUT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SUCH A FACTOR AS THE PARTICULARS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES, WHICH INFLUENCE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. THESE PARTICULARS WERE IN THE FIELD OF VISION OF THE SIDES DURING NEGOTIATION OF THE 1972 INTERIM AGREEMENT AND WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT TO A CERTAIN EXTENT IN WORKING OUT THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THAT AGREEMENT. IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT THIS FACTOR MUST BE COMPREHENSIVELY CON-

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SIDERED AND APPROPRIATELY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985.

THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES ALSO ENSUES FROM RECOGNITION OF THE EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SIDES. OF COURSE, IF THERE WERE ONLY TWO NUCLEAR STATES IN THE WORLD, THE USSR AND THE U.S. THE TASKS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS WOULD APPEAR IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT. THIS, HOWEVER, IS NOT THE

CASE. THE EXISTENCE OF THIRD NUCLEAR STATES IS A COMPONENT ELEMENT OF THE WORLD STRATEGIC SITUATION. THE EXISTENCE AND POSSIBLE BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIR COUNTRIES DURING THE TERM OF THE AGREEMENT CANNOT BUT AFFECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SIDES, AND IN THIS CONNECTION THE INFLUENCE OF THIS FACTOR MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT,AND SOMETIMES EVEN DIRECTLY OPPOSITE, SIGNIFICANCE FOR EACH OF THE SIDES. WORKING OUT A VIABLE NEW AGREEMENT DEMANDS CAFEFUL CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION AND AN ACCOUNT FOR ALL ITS ASPECTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE DURATION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS ENVISIONED IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF JYLY 3, 1974.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPOSE THAT IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, LIMITATIONS BE CONSIDERED FOR ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, WITH AN APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT FOR THE PARTICULARS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES AND THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIR COUNTRIES.

UNQUOTE  
JOHNSON

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